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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The May 2002 issue of Volume 54 of the Federal Communications 
Law Journal contained a lengthy article titled The Concrete Barrier at the 
End of the Information Superhighway: Why Lack of Local Rights-of-Way 
Access Is Killing Competitive Local Exchange Carriers, by Christopher R. 
 
* Of Counsel, Miller & Van Eaton, P.L.L.C., Washington, D.C., with the assistance of 
Laurie Gelman, J.D., George Washington University. Mr. Malone has previously reviewed 
several books for the Federal Communications Law Journal, including both volumes of the 
legislative history of the Communications Act of 1934 as compiled for the Bar by the 
Golden Jubilee Commission on Telecommunications. Miller & Van Eaton’s practice 
includes the representation of local governments in disputes with telephone companies and 
cable operators. 
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Day, a graduate fellow at the Institute for Public Representation, 
Georgetown University Law Center, with the assistance of two former 
colleagues at the law firm of Swidler, Berlin, Shereff, Friedman, LLP, 
which represents a multiplicity of competitive local exchange carriers 
(“CLECs”).1 The thrust of Day’s article is that local governments, in 
franchising use of their rights-of-way, are improperly obstructing 
development of CLECs in violation of Section 253 of the 
Telecommunications Act of 19962 (1996 Act), as added to the 
Communications Act of 1934. Day first proposes that Congress amend 
Section 253 to create a national rights-of-way access standard.3 
Alternatively, he proposes that the Enforcement Bureau of the Federal 
Communications Commission (“FCC”), without further legislation, create a 
“rocket docket” that could resolve rights-of-way access disputes between 
CLECs and local franchising authorities.4 The editors of the Journal are to 
be complimented on the timely publication of an article on an issue that is 
very hotly contested across the country, and on which the courts have not 
fully agreed. The factual predicate, which Day marshals for his legislative 
proposal, and its substance and constitutionality are no less debatable than 
his construction of Section 253, with which the courts have struggled since 
1996.5 Similarly, the existing statutory and constitutional bases for his 
alternative administrative proposal are equally dubious. The purpose of this 
Article is to question the factual and analytical bases of Day’s proposals. 
Day offers no persuasive evidence that “lack of local rights-of-way 
access is killing competitive local exchange carriers.”6 While 
acknowledging that “some of the blame for the failure of local competition 
may be placed on failed business models and the withdrawal of venture 
capital from the market,”7 Day’s article charges that the Congress’s and 
 
 1. Christopher R. Day, The Concrete Barrier at the End of the Information 
Superhighway: Why Lack of Local Rights-of-Way Access is Killing Competitive Local 
Exchange Carriers, 54 FED. COMM. L.J. 461 (2002). 
 2. 47 U.S.C. § 253 (2000). 
 3. Day, supra note 1, at 487-90. 
 4. Id. at 490-91. 
 5. Cablevision of Boston, Inc. v. Pub. Improvement Comm’n of Boston, 184 F.3d 88 
(1st Cir. 1999); N.J. Payphone Ass’n v. Town of West New York, 299 F.3d 235 (3d Cir. 
2002). Compare BellSouth Telecomms., Inc. v. City of Coral Springs, Fla., 42 F. Supp. 2d 
1304 (S.D. Fla. 1999) with City of Auburn v. Qwest Corp., 247 F.3d 966 (9th Cir. 2001). 
But see Qwest Corp. v. City of Portland, 200 F. Supp. 2d 1250 (D. Or. 2002); AT&T 
Comms. of the Pac. Northwest, Inc., v. City of Eugene, 35 P.3d 1029 (Or. App. 2001); 
Qwest Comms. Corp. v. City of Berkeley, 146 F. Supp. 2d 1081 (N.D. Cal. 2001). See also 
TCG N.Y., Inc. v. City of White Plains, 305 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 2002); TC Sys., Inc. v. Town 
of Colonie, N.Y., 213 F. Supp. 2d 171 (N.D.N.Y. 2002). 
 6. Day, supra note 1, at 461. 
 7. Id. at 462. 
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FCC’s “failure to adequately address municipal rights-of-way access for 
CLECs” is a “regulatory failure” creating an “inhospitable environment” 
for CLECs.8 The view that lack of access to local rights-of-way is a major 
factor in CLEC failures does not appear to be the prevailing view among 
CLECs, even in two states that have experienced vigorous right-of-way 
litigation—Michigan and Maryland. In responding to an earlier survey by 
the Michigan Public Service Commission to identify barriers to entry, none 
of the CLECs identified local rights-of-way as an obstacle to the 
development of competition.9 Kraemer and May’s study, “Local Exchange 
Competition: Progress in Maryland,” concluded that “competition exists in 
Maryland; there appear to be no barriers to entry.”10 
Recent publication of a book setting forth an insider’s view of the 
CLEC debacle barely mentions local rights-of-way franchising as a CLEC 
issue.11 Rather, because the managers of the CLECs did not grow up in the 
telephone business, but the inter-exchange carrier (“IXC”) business, they 
were simply slow to realize that obtaining rights-of-way across farmland 
was uncomplicated compared to rights-of-way within a city.12 In fact, large 
numbers of CLECs overcame any such urban problems—47 in Atlanta, 38 
in Chicago, 46 in Dallas, 38 in Los Angeles, and 45 in New York.13 
McDermott attributes the failures of CLECs to management failures as 
mundane as incorrect billing.14 His final chapter anticipating “Rebound” of 
the industry relies on neither changes in local rights-of-way policies nor 
amendment of the 1996 Act.15 
Day’s assumption that local right-of-way franchising is a significant 
barrier to CLECs is highly questionable as a factual matter. It has been my 
experience in representing numerous municipalities in right-of-way 
franchising matters that carriers that have accepted the local franchising 
process have been readily franchised. After all, for area economic 
development purposes, local governments are anxious to have competitive 
telecommunications services available to local businesses and residents are 
 
 8. Id. 
 9. MICHIGAN PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION, REPORT ON LOCAL TELEPHONE 
INTERCONNECTION (1998) (submitted to the Governor and Michigan Legislature). 
 10. Joseph S. Kraemer and Randolph J. May, Local Exchange Competition: Progress in 
Maryland, The Progress and Freedom Foundation: Progress on Point 28 (May 2002). 
 11. See MARTIN F. MCDERMOTT III, CLEC: TELECOM ACT 1996: AN INSIDER’S LOOK AT 
THE RISE AND FALL OF LOCAL EXCHANGE COMPETITION (2002). 
 12. Id. at 5, 11. 
 13. Id. at 57 (citing 2001 CLEC Report published by New Paradigm Resources); see 
also id. at 204, 206. 
 14. Id. at 222, 241, 304. 
 15. Id. at 316. 
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also anxious to derive compensation for their investments in local rights-of-
way.16 It is only those telecommunications carriers, misapprehending the 
language and intent of Section 253, that resist local franchising or rights-of-
way, resist paying compensation based on value instead of on costs, or 
resist paying compensation partially in-kind that may encounter “concrete 
barriers” to their exploitation of the public rights-of-way. A mere increase 
in cost is not a barrier to entry.17 
II.  SECTION 253 WAS NOT INTENDED TO PREEMPT LOCAL 
AUTHORITY 
Day misconceives the original intent of Section 253(c). In Section II 
of his article, Day states “the premise that the overarching intent of Section 
253 is to eliminate anything that could constitute a barrier to entry in the 
newly deregulated telecommunications market.”18 Contrary to Day’s 
certitude, such a Section 253(c)-specific premise is at most highly 
controversial. The interpretational controversy arises in part from the fact 
that courts say, “Section 253 is quite inartfully drafted and has created a 
fair amount of confusion.”19 Much of these courts’ difficulty in interpreting 
Section 253 arises out of their failure to recognize that the overall 
procompetitive purpose of the 1996 Act, as described in the conference 
report, but not in the act itself,20 is subservient to the specific purpose of 
Section 253(c) to preserve local governments’ jurisdiction over local rights-
of-way. Thus, while Section 253(a) is manifestly designed to carry out the 
general, procompetitive purpose of the 1996 Act, Section 253(c) carries an  
interpretational instruction to the courts that nothing in subsection (a) shall 
affect prior existing authority of the local governments. 
 
 16. There has never been a definitive study done on the value of the public rights-of-
way. But cf. 141 CONG. REC. 22035 (1995) (statement of Rep. Stupak) (mentioning the 
figure of $100 billion per annum of municipal rights-of-way investment); TeleCommUnity, 
Valuation of the Public Rights-of-Way Asset 5 (Mar. 2002), at http://www. 
telecommunityalliance.org/images/valuation2002.pdf (noting that during the debate it was 
mentioned that “using a conservative assumption, the value ranges from $1.1 Trillion for the 
improvements alone to $4.7 Trillion for the improvements and the ATF land value”). 
 17. See AT&T v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 389-90 (1999). 
 18. Day, supra note 1, at 468. 
 19. N.J. Payphone Ass’n v. Town of West New York, 299 F.3d 235, 240 (3d Cir. 
2002); see also Cablevision of Boston v. Pub. Improvement Comm’n of Boston, 184 F.3d 
88, 102 (1st Cir. 1999) (stating that “the weight of authority seems to favor [a] contextual 
interpretation of [Section] 253(c) over a literal, syntactically accurate one”). 
 20. S. CONF. REP. NO. 104-230, at 1 (1996) (stating that the purpose of the legislation 
was “to provide for a pro-competitive, de-regulatory national policy framework designed to 
accelerate rapidly private sector deployment of advanced telecommunications and 
information technologies and services to all Americans by opening all telecommunications 
markets to competition”), quoted in Day, supra note 1, at 487 n.131. 
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This result is not as strange as it might seem to the uninitiated. In 
enacting Section 253 in 1996, Congress made a conscious political decision 
to leave right-of-way franchising in the hands of the local franchising 
authorities where it has always been.21 Day criticizes governmental action 
to date as failing to advance the “pro-competitive, de-regulatory national 
policy framework” of the 1996 Act, citing the legislative history of the 
Act.22 It is commonplace in statutory construction, however, that the 
general purpose of an act does not control the construction of a provision 
with a specific legislative purpose.23 Allowing the general purpose of 
promoting competition to control the specific provisions of Section 253 
improperly “undermine[s] limitations” on federal authority embodied in 
Section 253.24 That is the case here. It is apparent from the course of the 
legislative bill that the purpose dominating the enactment of Section 253(c) 
was largely the preservation of existing local rights and responsibilities 
with respect to local rights-of-way. The Guaranty Clause25 and the Tenth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution require no less. 
In enacting Section 253 of the 1996 Act, Congress adopted a policy of 
fostering the entry of multiple providers into the local rights-of-way on a 
free-market basis. But Congress then stepped aside, leaving the 
traditionally local processes of managing public rights-of-way and 
collecting compensation for the value of local property under these 
changed conditions to the local governments, as the regulators and owners 
of those rights-of-way. 
Underpinning his call for amendment, Day argues under Section 
III.B. of his article that municipalities have misinterpreted Section 253(a)-
(c) as empowering their regulation of rights-of-way, rather than as the “safe 
harbor” Congress intended. As evidence of their claim to empowerment, he 
cites Metromedia Fiber Network Services’ comments to the FCC.26 The 
 
 21. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Cal., 346 U.S. 346, 
355 (1953) (stating that “use of public streets is a matter peculiarly of local concern, and 
great leeway is allowed local authorities, . . . even though interstate commerce may be 
subject to material interference”). 
 22. Day, supra note 1, at 487 n.131. 
 23. Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 526 (1987) (stating “it frustrates rather 
than effectuates legislative intent simplistically to assume that whatever furthers the 
statute’s primary objective must be the law”); Bd. of Governors v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 
474 U.S. 361, 374 (1986) (stating “[i]nvocation of the ‘plain purpose’ of legislation at the 
expense of the terms of the statute itself takes no account of the processes of compromise”); 
Cablevision of Boston, 184 F.3d at 96, 101-02 (Section 253 reflects a balancing of 
conflicting views). 
 24. See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 511 (1996). 
 25. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. 
 26. Day, supra note 1, at 469 n.31. 
MALONE FINAL 3/5/2003  2:59 PM 
256 FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 55 
citation does not satisfy the “best evidence” rule. In point of fact, I know of 
no instance in which a local government has pursued the claim—with the 
FCC or with a federal court—that it derives right-of-way franchising 
powers from Section 253(c) of the Act, rather than from state law. 
Under Section III.B. of his article, Day argues that four local right-of-
way practices violate Section 253 of the Act. Each of the supposed 
violations of purpose that Day cites were specifically considered by 
Congress and rejected. Where Congress specifically rejects a particular 
approach, that approach cannot be a valid interpretation of the statutory text 
ultimately adopted.27 As the Supreme Court said in INS v. Cardoza-
Fonseca, of Congress’s enacting the language from a House bill rather than 
the language from the companion Senate bill: “Few principles of statutory 
construction are more compelling than the proposition that Congress does 
not intend sub silentio to enact statutory language that it has earlier 
discarded in favor of other language.”28 Thus, Congress’s intent to preserve 
local authority is embodied in the carefully drawn structure and language of 
the section. 
The language that became subsection (c) originated by amendment in 
both houses, but only on the House side was adoption of the amendment 
 
Petition for Declaratory Ruling, City Signal Communications, Inc. v. City of 
Cleveland Heights, CS Docket No. 00-253, Comments of Metromedia Fiber 
Network Services, Inc. at 8 (filed Jan. 31, 2001). 
Access to public rights-of-way is almost routinely conditioned on MFNS’ 
provision of monetary or in-kind compensation that clearly violates the 
[1996] Act and/or state law. In most cases, the Municipality is clearly 
prohibited under state law from requiring compensation for use of the rights-
of-way, but the municipality makes the argument that the law is no longer 
valid in light of the [1996] Act, changing technology, or an absurd 
interpretation of the law. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
Id. (hereinafter omitted). 
 27. People v. Adamowski, 65 N.W.2d 753, 757 (Mich. 1954); accord INS v. Cardoza-
Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 442-43 (1987); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Dept. of Ins., 491 N.W.2d 616, 
620 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992); see also HCSC-Laundry v. United States, 450 U.S. 1, 6-8 
(1981); Norwegian Nitrogen Prods. Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294, 306 (1933); 
NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STAT. CONST. § 48.18 (5th ed. 1992): 
One of the most readily available extrinsic aids to the interpretation of statutes is 
the action of the legislature on amendments which are proposed to be made during 
the course of consideration in the legislature. Both the state and federal courts will 
refer to proposed changes in a bill in order to interpret the statute as finally 
enacted. . . . Generally the rejection of an amendment indicates that the legislature 
does not intend the bill to include the provisions embodied in the rejected 
amendment. 
Id. 
 28. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 442-43 (quoting Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit 
Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 392-93 (1980) (Stewart, J., dissenting)). 
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accompanied by illuminating controversy. Subsection (c) was first added to 
the Senate bill, S. 652, in committee markup.29 The amendment was 
sponsored by Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison, who had raised in the Senate 
Commerce Committee’s hearings her concern that Congress should protect 
local governments’ rights. She argued that local governments had to retain 
full power to manage and to receive compensation for telecommunications 
providers’ use of public rights-of-way.30 The Senate passed the amendment 
without significant change in its language. The House’s substitute bill, H.R. 
1555, was originally more preemptive of the local governments’ interests: 
(b) STATE AND LOCAL AUTHORITY.—Nothing in this section shall 
affect the ability of State or local officials to impose, on a 
nondiscriminatory basis, requirements necessary to preserve and 
advance universal service, protect the public safety and welfare, ensure 
the continued quality of telecommunications services, ensure that a 
provider’s business practices are consistent with consumer protection 
laws and regulations, and ensure just and reasonable rates, provided 
that such requirements do not effectively prohibit any carrier or person 
from providing interstate or intrastate telecommunications services or 
information services.31 
That bill was voted out of committee only after a so-called managers’ 
amendment on the floor to soften any federal preemption. Ultimately, the 
managers’ amendment did not satisfy the House members who opposed 
preemption of local governments’ police power and property rights. The 
issue was debated on the floor between the proponents of the managers’ 
amendment and the proponents of an amendment by Congressmen Barton 
and Stupak.32 The floor debates led to rejection of the managers’ 
amendment to Section 253 and the substitution of the Stupak-Barton 
amendment by a floor vote of 338-86.33 During the floor debates, 
Congressman Stupak explained the effect of his amendment: 
[I]f our amendment is not adopted, if the Stupak-Barton amendment is 
not adopted, you will have companies in many areas securing free 
access to public property. Taxpayers paid for this property, taxpayers 
paid to maintain this property, and it simply is not fair to ask the 
taxpayers to continue to subsidize telecommunication companies.34 
Congressman Barton confirmed the protection of both police power and 
property rights of the local governments in these words: 
 
 
 29. 141 CONG. REC. 15986 (1995). 
 30. Id. at  15648. 
 31. H.R. REP. NO. 104-204, title 1, pt. 2, at 5 (1995). 
 32. 141 CONG. REC. 22035-52 (1995). 
 33. Id. at 22052. 
 34. Id. at 22035. 
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[The amendment] explicitly guarantees that cities and local 
governments have the right to not only control access within their city 
limits, but also to set the compensation level for the use of that right-
of-way. . . . 
The Chairman’s [managers’] amendment has tried to address this 
problem. It goes part of the way, but not the entire way. The Federal 
Government has absolutely no business telling State and local 
government how to price access to their local right-of-way.35 
In the end, the managers’ preemptive amendment was rejected because it 
did not go “the entire way” in protecting local governments’ property rights 
in and police power over rights-of-way. 
Day’s objection to expressions of local authority, which he sees as 
inconsistent with the general competitive thrust of the 1996 Act, were the 
same objections raised by Congressman Shaefer and others in the House 
debate of the bill.36 But Congressman Shaefer’s position was resoundingly 
rejected in the House’s adoption of the Stupak-Barton amendment. Since 
the amendments to Section 253(a), (b), and (c) that passed the two houses 
were “identical or similar,”37 the House debate and vote stand as a 
considered and deliberate congressional rejection of Day’s assumption, viz, 
the general procompetitive purpose of the bill requires a broadly 
preemptive reading of the language of Section 253 instead of a narrowly 
preemptive reading.38 In arguing, essentially, for implied preemption in 
Section 253 by relying on a generalized purpose—contrary to the teaching 
of Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr39 and the instruction of Section 601(c)(1) of the 
1996 Act40—Day attempts to reopen issues that were conclusively settled 
by Congress. Moreover, where Congress has expressly defined the scope of 
preemption, any implication of preemption arising out of the Commerce 
 
 35. Id. at 22036. 
 36. Id. 
 37. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-458, at 127 (1996). 
 38. Cf. Bd. of Governors v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 474 U.S. 361, 373-74 (1986). 
 39. 518 U.S. 470, 484-86 (1996) (stating federal statutes should be construed to 
minimize federal preemption); accord Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 518 
(1992) (stating “we must construe these provisions in light of the presumption against the 
pre-emption of state police power regulations”). 
 40. 47 U.S.C. § 152 note (2000). 
Sec. 601. Applicability of consent decrees and other law. . . . 
(c) Federal, State, and Local Law.— 
(1) No Implied Effect.—This Act and the amendments made by this Act shall not 
be construed to modify, impair, or supersede Federal, State, or local law unless 
expressly so provided in such Act or amendments. 
Id. In the course of passage, Section 601(c) evolved into its present form, “prevent[ing] 
affected parties from asserting that the bill impliedly pre-empts other laws.” H.R. CONF. 
REP. NO. 104-458, at 201 (1996). 
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Clause is foreclosed.41 The silent or dormant Commerce Clause does not 
override Congress’s express limitation of preemption in subsection (c). 
Day’s objections to local rights-of-way regulation and compensation have 
already been considered by Congress and explicitly rejected. 
A. Right-of-Way Fees Are Not Limited to Costs 
Day believes that local governments’ charging a fee in an amount 
beyond the cost of actual rights-of-way management activities for use of 
the public rights-of-way is a misinterpretation of Section 253.42 Anything 
more than recovery of costs, he argues, constitutes an unlawful barrier. 
However, his assumption that Section 253 allows only recovery of “actual 
costs incurred by [local governments] for their use of the public rights-of-
way,”43 fails as directly contrary to the legislative history of that section. 
Congress expressly preserved the local governments’ authority to obtain 
“compensation from . . . providers . . . for use of the public rights-of-way,” 
not just to recover the local governments’ costs related to occupancy.44 
Day’s objection to fees and in-kind compensation was debated and 
rejected on the House floor. Indeed, his very point was raised by opponents 
of the Stupak-Barton amendment to subsection (c) and rejected in the 
vigorous floor debate between the managers’ amendment and the Stupak-
Barton amendment.45 The legislative history shows a dominant intention on 
the part of Congress to give the local governments great latitude as to 
charges.46 During the debate on the rule under which the committee bill 
was to be brought to the House floor, the manager for the bill, 
Congressman Bliley, a former mayor of Richmond, Virginia, and a former 
president of the Virginia Municipal League, assured the members, in 
answer to a question from Congressman Goss, also a former mayor, that 
 
 41. See Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 154-55 (1982); Northeast 
Bancorp, Inc. v. Bd. of Governors, 472 U.S. 159, 174 (1985); Transp. Co. v. Parkersburg, 
107 U.S. 691, 701 (1883) (stating “[i]t is Congress, and not the Judicial Department, to 
which the Constitution has given the power to regulate commerce”); Willson v. Black Bird 
Marsh Creek Co., 27 U.S. 245, 252 (1829); see also So. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 
769 (1945) (stating in dictum the “undoubted power” of Congress). 
 42. Day, supra note 1, at 470. 
 43. Id. 
 44. See TCG Detroit v. Dearborn, 16 F. Supp. 2d 785, 789 (E.D. Mich. 1998) (stating 
that “there is nothing inappropriate with the city charging compensation, or ‘rent’, for the 
City owned property that the Plaintiff seeks to appropriate for its private use”), aff’d 206 
F.3d 618 (6th Cir. 2000); see also City of Auburn v. Qwest Corp., 260 F.3d 1160, 1176 n.11 
(9th Cir. 2002) (acknowledging—if not adopting—the Sixth Circuit’s decision upholding 
the city’s gross receipts-based right-of-way franchise fee). 
 45. 141 CONG. REC. 21683 (1995). 
 46. Id. 
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even the managers’ amendment allowed: 
[T]he councils . . . and the mayor [to] make any charge they want 
provided they do not charge the cable company one fee and they 
charge a telephone company a lower fee for the same right-of-way. 
They should not discriminate, and that is all we say. Charge what you 
will, but . . . . [d]o not discriminate in favor of one or the other.47 
Bearing in mind that franchise fees for cable companies were 
expected to be based on gross receipts, limited to 5% of gross revenues 
under Section 622(b) of the Cable Act,48 it is apparent from the colloquy 
that the members expected the franchise fees on telecommunications 
providers to be on a comparable basis with cable fees, i.e., a percentage of 
gross revenues. When the Stupak-Barton amendment was on the floor of 
the House two days later, both of the proponents argued competitive effect 
in gross receipts-based terms. Congressman Schaefer attacked the Stupak-
Barton amendment on the grounds that it would allow “8[%] of the gross, 
the gross, of the [providers] who are coming in,”49 and argued that unless 
his amendment was adopted, providers in one city would be “assessed up to 
11[%] of gross revenues as a condition for doing business there.”50 Eleven 
percent, he argued, had nothing to do with “control of right-of-way.”51 
Congressman Bliley opposed the Stupak-Barton amendment to the 
committee bill on the grounds that the amendment allowed the 
municipalities to charge the telecommunications providers more than the 
cable operators.52 
Congressman Fields objected that: 
When a percentage of revenue fee is imposed by a city on a 
telecommunication provider for use of rights-of-way, that fee becomes 
a cost of doing business for that provider, and, if you will, the cost of a 
ticket to enter the market. That is anticompetitive. 
. . . [W]hat does control of right-of-way have to do with assessing a fee 
of 11 percent of gross revenue? Absolutely nothing. 
Such large gross revenue assessments bear no relation to the cost of 
using a right-of-way and clearly are arbitrary. It seems clear that the 
cities are really looking for new sources of revenue.53 
The proponents, on the other hand, made it clear that the intent of 
their amendment was to make sure that the cities were fairly compensated 
 
 47. Id. 
 48. 47 U.S.C. § 542(b) (2000). 
 49. 141 CONG. REC. 22036 (1995). 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
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for the use of public property, in which they invested $100 billion a year.54 
The intent was that they be compensated at the free-market rate.55 
Congressman Barton urged the House to vote for his amendment on the 
grounds that it went “the entire way” in rejecting any kind of federal price 
controls over franchise fees.56 Thus, Day’s objections to a gross revenues-
based franchise fee already have been raised and were rejected in the 338-
86 vote adopting the Stupak-Barton amendment.57 Since both the 
proponents and opponents of the amendment agreed on the effect of the 
amendment, that vote is conclusive as to its meaning. 
A gross receipts-based fee yields compensation proportionate to the 
providers’ use of the rights-of-way. What Day misapprehends in his 
argument against gross receipts-based fees is that gross receipts are a 
reasonable proxy for intensity of use. The providers’ use of the rights-of-
way is to carry voice and data from one place to another—that is the 
business of a telecommunications common carrier. Local governments can 
reasonably use gross receipts as a measure of the amount of “information” 
being carried by the carriers through the rights-of-way—the number of 
bytes being “pumped” through the rights-of-way, if you will. This measure 
is not different in principle from the railroads charging by the pound, 
whether it is for freight carried in their boxcars or in a trucking company’s 
trailers loaded on a flat car. 
Rather than being a barrier, a right-of-way charge based on 
percentage of gross revenues favors developing competition and the entry 
of competitors to the incumbent local exchange carrier (“ILEC”). During 
start-up when cash flow is low, a new company’s franchise fee expense is 
proportionally low. Most start-ups would like to have all their landlords 
charge rent during the early years, capped by a percentage of gross 
revenues. 
Section 253(a)-(d) does not clearly treat compensation the way that 
Day thinks it ought to. In that sense, an amendment to make it mean what 
Day thinks it ought to mean is an appropriate proposal for him to make. I 
submit, however, that Congress got it right in 1996, because there are legal 
barriers to enactment of Day’s proposal for congressional action. Aside 
from constitutionally based considerations of intergovernmental relations 
informing a proper interpretation of Section 253, the Fifth Amendment 
limits the extent to which Congress went under Section 253 and might 
properly go under Day’s proposal. As valuable public property, the public 
 
 54. Id. at 22035. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 22036. 
 57. Id. at 22052-53. 
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rights-of-way are protected from federal takings for use in private 
businesses for profit.58 The local franchising authorities—whether outright 
owners or as trustees of their streets and roads under state law—have an 
obligation to their taxpayers to receive fair compensation for such use by 
private enterprises.59 The CLECs have no greater claim to use of the public 
rights-of-way for their lines than they do to the use of landlords’ private 
property to house their switches or support their lines.60 
Telecommunications providers who place their cables in the county’s 
rights-of-way enjoy no less a permanent physical occupancy requiring 
compensation than the cable company hanging its cables from and across 
Mrs. Loretto’s apartment building in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan 
CATV Corp.61 and providers placing their switching equipment in a 
telephone company’s central offices in Bell Atlantic v. FCC.62 As to streets, 
the question has actually been decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in St. 
Louis v. Western Union Telephone Co., where the Court held that the city 
was entitled to rent as a demand of proprietorship.63 
Section 253(c) allows the county to recover “fair and reasonable 
compensation . . . for use of public rights-of-way”64 from the 
telecommunications companies. Day contends that this language should 
limit local governments to cost-based fees. But cost recovery is not the 
measure under the Fifth Amendment. Whatever value a court might 
ultimately settle upon under the cost calculus, it obviously understates the 
appropriate compensation for the loss of the “economically beneficial or 
productive use of land.”65 Compensation for loss of the value of the 
property over its cost is not fully captured by a cost-based measure. 
 
 58. See United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 31 (1984) (holding that the 
“reference to ‘private property’ in the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment 
encompass[es] the property of . . . local governments when it is condemned by the United 
States”); see also United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, 242 (1946) (explaining that the 
takings doctrine applies to the federal government’s acquisition of state and local 
government property). 
 59. See City of Gary v. Ind. Bell Tel. Co., 732 N.E.2d 149, 156 (Ind. 2000) (declaring a 
rights-of-way fee “based in part on a percentage of the company’s gross revenues” 
represents fair compensation for use of public property). 
 60. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982); Bell 
Atl. Tel. Cos. v. FCC, 24 F.3d 1441 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
 61. Loretto, 458 U.S. 419. 
 62. Bell Atl. Tel. Cos., 24 F.3d 1441. 
 63. St. Louis v. W. Union Tel. Co., 148 U.S. 92, 97 (1892), on reh’g, 149 U.S. 465 
(1893); accord City of Dallas v. FCC, 118 F.3d 393, 397-98 (5th Cir. 1997). 
 64. 47 U.S.C. § 253(c) (2000). 
 65. Front Royal and Warren County Indus. Park Corp. v. Town of Front Royal, 135 
F.3d 275, 285 (4th Cir. 1998) (citing Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 
(1992)). 
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Section 253 can be read in a manner consistent with the intentions of 
Congress and good public policy, without infringing on Fifth Amendment 
concerns, by allowing recovery of full market value. Any other reading 
effects a taking of the county’s property, whether held in fee or in trust for 
others or otherwise controlled. Congress could not have intended a 
different result in Section 253(c). Aside from the extensive and explicit 
legislative history that endorses valuation-based pricing for franchise rights 
conveyed, Congress was silent on the issue it had to address if it had 
intended a taking of local government property. Congress created no 
authorization or appropriation of federal funds to compensate local 
governments for a federal taking of the value that is otherwise conveyed 
through right-of-way franchises. There is no indication Congress thought 
its actions constituted a taking or that the federal government should be 
prepared to pay the bill for the transfer of the value of the rights-of-way 
from local taxpayers to private telecommunications companies.66 The 
negative implication is unavoidable. Congress must have intended that the 
telecommunications companies keep the taxpayers whole and pay the 
appropriate amount for the value of the rights-of-way received through 
rights-of-way franchises to the extent permitted by state law. 
Under whatever theory, it is equally clear that Congress did not intend 
to shift the financial shortfall to the local governments. In the debate on the 
Stupak-Barton amendment on the House floor, the potential applicability of 
the Unfunded Mandates Act67 was raised.68 Had the Stupak-Barton 
amendment not been substituted for the managers’ amendment, so that 
Section 253 would have imposed a financial loss on the local governments, 
the Unfunded Mandates Act would have been invoked. The Stupak-Barton 
amendment was intended to avoid, in the words of the co-author of the 
language finally adopted, a $100 billion unfunded mandate.69 Read as a 
limitation to costs, the bill that became the 1996 Act would have been 
subject to a point of order under Section 2(6) of the Unfunded Mandates 
 
 66. In fact, this approach stands in stark contrast to Congress’s explicit endorsement of 
the FCC’s auctioning off the federal rights-of-way in the form of electromagnetic spectrum 
frequencies. See 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(3) (2000). The spectrum auctions, as the FCC states 
publicly, were carefully designed to force the companies to pay “full market value” for the 
use of frequencies. Implementation of Section 309(j) of the Comm. Act, Memorandum 
Opinion and Order, 14 F.C.C.R. 8724, paras. 50-51, 15 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 714 (1999). 
Yet no one argues that a cellular company’s use of frequencies imposes additional costs on 
the federal government comparable to the more than $40 billion raised through the auction 
process. FCC Auctions Summary, at http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/summary.html (last 
updated Jan. 2, 2003). 
 67. 2 U.S.C. § 1501 (2000). 
 68. 141 CONG. REC. 22035 (1995). 
 69. Id. 
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Act.70 Thus, it is proper to infer from the absence of such a point of order 
that the House, by adopting Stupak-Barton, knowingly dodged the 
unfunded mandate bullet by not depriving the local governments of 
revenues from their rights-of-way properties. 
B. Differential Compensation Is Not Discriminatory 
Day also argues that favorable municipal treatment of incumbent 
providers is a barrier that unfairly disadvantages new entrants to the 
market.71 He complains that such unfair treatment occurs when a new 
entrant is charged a gross receipts-based fee or certain upfront charges not 
required of the incumbent. The circuit courts are divided on this question.72 
Here again, this issue was thoroughly debated and decided in the 
House. Congress clearly intended to include franchise fees within the 
subsection (c) safe harbor, even to the extent that fees might be applied 
differently to ILECs and CLECs. Congress having decided the question, 
there is no basis in original meaning for Day’s argument to the contrary. 
Section 243 of the House bill, which as amended became Section 253, 
contained the so-called “parity” provision in a fifth subsection: 
(e) PARITY OF FRANCHISE AND OTHER CHARGES.—Notwithstanding 
section 2(b), [47 U.S.C. § 152(b)] no local government may impose or 
collect any franchise, license, permit, or right-of-way fee or any 
assessment, rental, or any other charge or equivalent thereof as a 
condition for operating in the locality or for obtaining access to, 
occupying, or crossing public rights-of-way from any provider of 
telecommunications services that distinguishes between or among 
providers of telecommunications services, including the local 
exchange carrier.73 
In his remarks on the House floor during the debate on H.R. 1555, 
Congressman Stupak particularly stressed that the Stupak-Barton 
amendment would delete the requirement for parity between the ILEC and 
other providers and instead could allow different compensation from 
different providers for use of the rights-of-way. He stated: 
Local governments must be able to distinguish between different 
telecommunication providers. . . . 
 
 70. § 1501. 
 71. Day, supra note 1, at 471. 
 72. See TCG New York v. City of White Plains, 305 F.3d 67, 77-78 (2d Cir. 2002) 
(declining to decide the question, while noting that the circuits have split on the issue of 
gross receipts-based fees and citing TCG Detroit v. City of Dearborn, 206 F.3d 618, 624-25 
(6th Cir. 2000) and City of Auburn v. Qwest Corp., 260 F.3d 1160, 1179 (9th Cir. 2002)). 
The Second Circuit’s reading of City of Auburn is not, as noted infra, the only reading 
possible. 
 73. H.R. REP. NO. 104-204, pt. 1, at 6 (1995). 
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The manager’s amendment states that local governments would have 
to charge the same fee to every company, regardless of how much or 
how little they use the right-of-way or rip up our streets. Because the 
contracts have been in place for many years, some as long as 100 
years, if our amendment is not adopted, if the Stupak-Barton 
amendment is not adopted, you will have companies in many areas 
securing free access to public property. Taxpayers paid for this 
property, taxpayers paid to maintain this property, and it simply is not 
fair to ask the taxpayers to continue to subsidize telecommunication 
companies.74 
Clearly the Stupak-Barton amendment contemplated different fees 
between new entrants and any grandfathered ILEC. Over the vigorous 
opposition of Congressman Schaefer, the author of the “MFS amendment,” 
the House debated and adopted the Stupak-Barton amendment by an 
overwhelming vote of 338-86. In arguing vigorously (and unsuccessfully) 
against the Stupak-Barton amendment, Congressman Schaefer made many 
of the same arguments that Day makes. For example, Congressman 
Schaefer claimed that acceptance of the Stupak-Barton amendment “is 
going to allow the local governments to slow down and even derail the 
movement to real competition.”75 Congressman Fields claimed that cities 
are allowed to charge incumbent telephone companies little or nothing 
because of “a century-old charter . . . which may even predate the 
incorporation of the city itself. . . . [T]hey threaten to Balkanize the 
development of our national telecommunication infrastructure.”76 It was 
common ground between the sponsors and opponents that the Stupak-
Barton amendment would permit grandfathering of ILECs where 
constitutional law required. 
After hearing Congressman Schaefer’s arguments, the House rejected 
them and adopted the Stupak-Barton amendment by a vote of 338-86. By 
adopting Stupak-Barton, the House rejected the Schaefer-Fields arguments 
for the Schaefer parity language. By adopting Stupak-Barton, which was 
the same as the Senate’s bill in reference to fair and reasonable 
compensation for right-of-way use, the House overwhelmingly endorsed 
the result that differential compensation in such cases is not impermissibly 
discriminatory. 
 
 74. 141 CONG. REC. 22035 (1995). 
 75. Id. at 22036. 
 76. Id. 
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C. The So-Called “Third Tier” of Regulation Is a Red Herring 
Day asserts that the so-called “third tier” of regulation constitutes 
another barrier to entry prohibited by Section 253.77 Neither the 1996 Act 
nor its legislative history mentions “third-tier” regulation, much less 
prohibits it. The concept of a “third tier” of regulation is a creation of the 
FCC,78 based on a fundamental disregard of the federal structure of our 
government. To the extent that “third tier” refers to local regulations that 
duplicate federal regulations of “the rates, terms, and conditions under 
which telecommunications service is offered to the public,”79 such 
regulation of interstate services is federally preempted, whether imposed on 
the state or local level.80 To the extent that the “third tier” refers to the 
allocation of legislative responsibility among the levels of state and local 
government, that is a matter constitutionally reserved to each individual 
state and to its people. Congress should not be interpreted to have 
presumed to tell a state government at which level of government to place 
non-federal responsibilities.81 Such a presumed meaning of Section 253 
must be rejected, because it would violate the Guaranty Clause, Article IV, 
Section 4, and the Tenth Amendment. In any case, the FCC did not state 
that all “third-tier” regulations were “automatically prohibited;” it merely 
cautioned that such regulation would be subject to scrutiny. Against the 
specific examples of “third-tier” regulation that Day cites82 must be set the 
various court decisions recognizing the priority of such housekeeping 
regulations.83 Contrary to Day’s citation of the South Carolina Public 
Utility Act,84 BellSouth v. City of Orangeburg recognizes local  
 
 
 77. Day, supra note 1, at 473 (stating “[m]unicipal regulations that impose operational 
requirements on providers seeking access to the public rights-of-way serve as another 
barrier to competitive telecommunications providers”). 
 78. TCI Cablevision of Oakland County, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 12 
F.C.C.R. 21396, para. 105, 9 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 730 (1997). 
 79. Id. para. 106. 
 80. La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 374 (1986) (stating that a federal 
agency may preempt state law when it is acting within the scope of its congressionally 
delegated authority). 
 81. See City of Columbus v. Ours Garage, 536 U.S. 424, 437-440 (2002). 
 82. See Day, supra note 1, at 474-75. 
 83. See, e.g., Bell South Telecomms., Inc. v. Town of Palm Beach, 252 F.3d 1169, 
1182-86 (11th Cir. 2001); BellSouth Telecomms., Inc. v. City of Mobile, 171 F. Supp. 2d 
1261, 1270 (S.D. Ala. 2001); Qwest Corp. v. City of Portland, 200 F. Supp. 2d 1250, 1256 
(D. Or. 2002), appeal pending Ninth Circuit. 
 84. Day, supra note 1, at 486 n.127. 
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governments’ authority over rights-of-way.85 Day’s characterization of City 
of Auburn v. Qwest as “a strong opinion”86 overlooks the fact that the 
opinion was limited to wireless carriers, the issues as to wireline carriers 
having been disposed of on state-law grounds.87 Unlike the panel’s earlier 
withdrawn opinion, the revised opinion did not consider the cities’ 
regulatory measures as prohibitive on a disaggregated basis. 
D. Municipal Delay Is Not Prohibition 
Day accuses local governments of “continu[ing] to block rights-of-
way access as a means of extracting additional compensation from 
telecommunications providers”88 and appears to argue that municipal 
“delay” in granting access is an unlawful barrier to entry.89 There is no 
doubt that unreasonable delay is a barrier to entry, but negotiations over the 
amount of compensation clearly were contemplated by the Stupak-Barton 
amendment. “Section 253(a) speaks in terms of prohibition, not in terms of 
minor delays . . . . and occasional inconvenience.”90 The fact that a provider 
of telecommunications service can be denied the opportunity to install or 
maintain its facilities in public rights-of-way if it fails to register, enter into 
a lease, and pay a fee to the owner of those rights-of-way does not 
necessarily mean that all such requirements have a per se prohibitory effect 
under Section 253.91 A mere increase in cost does not impair the ability to 
enter.92 
E. The States Have Responded to Right-of-Way Issues in Different 
Ways 
In Section IV of his article, Day relies on the fact that a handful of 
states “have taken action to rein in municipal demands and foster the 
further development of facilities-based competition in the local 
telecommunications market”93 as evidence for his general proposition that 
 
 85. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc. v. City of Orangeburg, 522 S.E.2d 804, 807 (S.C. 
1999). 
 86. Day, supra note 1, at 482. 
 87. City of Auburn v. Qwest Corp., 247 F.3d 966 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 88. Day, supra note 1, at 476. 
 89. Id. at 475. 
 90. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc. v. City of Mobile, 171 F. Supp. 2d 1261, 1281-82 (S.D. 
Ala. 2001). 
 91. See TCG Detroit v. City of Dearborn, 206 F.3d 618, 624 (6th Cir. 2000); Qwest v. 
City of Portland, 200 F. Supp. 2d 1250, 1256 (D. Or. 2002), appeal pending Ninth Circuit. 
 92. AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 389-90 (1999) (construing similar 
language in Section 251); GTE Serv. Corp. v. FCC, 205 F.3d 416, 424 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
 93. Day, supra note 1, at 484. 
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direct fees, in-kind compensation, local regulations, and municipal “delays” 
constitute barriers to entry in violation of Section 253. First, it is certainly 
not surprising that in a federal system various states would have varying 
approaches to compensation and other rights-of-way management issues. 
The federal structure allows states to respond to local conditions and 
priorities. That is what Congress intended to allow by enacting Sections 
253(c) and 602(c)(1)94. Second, Day neglects to make note that other 
states—far from “rein[ing] in municipal demands”95—have chosen since 
1996 to enact legislation expressly establishing municipal authority for 
gross receipts-based charges96 including, for example, Illinois (up to 6% or 
7%, depending on population)97 and Washington (up to 6%, but may 
charge more if approved by a majority of voters).98 Many states have 
intricate relations between fees and taxes, e.g., Florida, Oregon, and 
Arizona.99 Congress itself placed the taxes “off-limits” from preemption by 
Section 601(c)(2),100 and the compensating credits, allowances, and 





 94. 110 Stat. 143-44, 47 U.S.C. § 152 note (1996). 
 95. Id. 
 96. ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-200-101(a)(1)(A) (Michie 1998) (fees not higher than those 
in effect on Jan. 1, 1997, or up to 4.25% may be required, but higher fees may be collected 
if agreed to by the provider or agreed to by voters); IDAHO CODE § 62-701A (Michie 2002) 
(reasonable fees may be required); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 354.59883 (Michie 1999) (cities 
and counties may not charge fees greater than “5 percent of the utility’s gross revenue from 
customers located within the jurisdiction,” and not greater than “5 percent of its gross 
revenue from the first $15 charged monthly for each line of access” on wireless service); 
N.D. CENT. CODE § 49-21-26 (1999) (unless local voters approve authority to impose fees 
other than management costs, political subdivisions may recover only “management costs,” 
which are “costs incurred” by the political subdivision “by the telecommunications 
company activity in the public right-of-way”). 
 97. 35 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 636/5-15 (2002). 
 98. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 35.21.870 (West 1990 & Supp. 2002). 
 99. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 202.19 (West Supp. 2003); OR. REV. STAT. § 221.515 (2001); 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 9-582 (Supp. 2002). 
 100. 110 Stat. 143-44, 47 U.S.C. § 152 note (1996). 
TITLE VI—EFFECT ON OTHER LAWS 
SEC. 601. APPLICABILITY OF CONSENT DECREES AND OTHER LAWS. . . . 
(C) FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL LAW. . . . 
(2) STATE TAX SAVINGS PROVISIONS.—Notwithstanding paragraph (1), nothing in 
this Act or the amendments made by this Act shall be construed to modify, impair, 
or supersede, or authorize the modification, impairment, or supersession of, any 
State or local law pertaining to taxation, except as provided in sections 622 and 
653(c) of the Communications Act of 1934 and section 602 of this Act. 
Id. 
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“compensating taxes” which the Supreme Court has reviewed in relation to 
the Commerce Clause.101 
III.  THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION LACKS 
JURISDICTION TO ADJUDICATE PROPERTY RIGHTS 
Day’s proposal to revamp the FCC’s procedure for adjudication fails 
to take into account the agency’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction.102 Here 
again, the language and the legislative history of subsection (d) reflect a 
specific congressional intent to preclude the FCC from adjudicating matters 
of state law. 
During the hearings on the Senate bill, Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison 
raised the concern that local governments’ right to manage and receive 
compensation for use of public rights-of-way by telecommunications 
providers be preserved. The Commerce Committee marked up S. 652 on 
March 23, 1995.103 Her principal concern was reflected in the provision 
which ultimately became Section 253(c). 
But the bill as reported by the Commerce, Science, and 
Transportation Committee also contained a stealth amendment in the form 
of subsection (d) that was not sought by Senator Hutchison, and for which 
no senator or committee staff member has publicly claimed responsibility. 
That amendment gave the FCC the authority to preempt local government 
action under subsection (c), as well as to preempt state regulatory action 
under subsection (b). It read: 
(d) If, after notice and an opportunity for public comment, the 
Commission determines that a State or local government has permitted 
or imposed any statute, regulation, or legal requirement that violates or 
is inconsistent with this section, the Commission shall immediately 
preempt the enforcement of such statute, regulation, or legal 
requirement to the extent necessary to correct such violation or 
inconsistency.104 
Local governments were pleased with the affirmation of their 
authority over rights-of-way reflected in the Hutchison amendment that 
became subsection (c).105 They were very concerned, however, that the 
broad provision for FCC preemption under subsection (d) could act to wipe 
out that authority. The provision for FCC adjudication of local right-of-way 
management and compensation authority in subsection (d) became the 
 
 101. See, e.g., Tyler Pipe Indus. v. Wash. Dept. of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 240-48 
(1987). 
 102. Day, supra note 1, at 490. 
 103. S. REP. NO. 104-23, at 14 (1995). 
 104. Id. at 96. 
 105. Id. 
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focus of local government concerns regarding S. 652 as it moved to the 
Senate floor in 1995. 
Senators Dirk Kempthorne and Diane Feinstein offered a floor 
amendment to strike subsection (d) entirely.106 This amendment would 
have entirely eliminated FCC jurisdiction over barriers to entry and over 
disputes under subsections (a), (b), and (c), leaving those disputes to the 
courts. The Feinstein-Kempthorne amendment failed by a vote of 44-56 on 
June 14, 1995.107 The Senate then adopted, by voice vote, a substitute 
amendment offered by Senator Slade Gorton and supported by Senators 
Feinstein and Kempthorne. The Gorton amendment, as adopted, read as 
follows: 
(d) If, after notice and an opportunity for public comment, the 
Commission determines that a State or local government has permitted 
or imposed any statute, regulation, or legal requirement that violates 
subsection (a) or (b), the Commission shall preempt the enforcement 
of such statute, regulation, or legal requirement to the extent necessary 
to correct such violation or inconsistency.108 
The purpose of the Gorton amendment was to preclude FCC 
jurisdiction over disputes involving local government authority over rights-
of-way management and compensation, while preserving FCC jurisdiction 
over other forms of telecommunications business regulation by state or 
local regulators.109 
The floor debate over the Kempthorne-Feinstein amendment, together 
with the debate over the subsequently adopted substitute Gorton 
amendment, makes clear that the Senate’s intent in adopting the Gorton 
amendment was to completely remove FCC jurisdiction over subsection (c) 
disputes about whether local government management of compensation 
requirements for rights-of-way are competitively neutral or 
nondiscriminatory. In explaining the Feinstein-Kempthorne amendment, 
Senator Feinstein had stated that, for example, “the FCC lacks the expertise 
to address cities’ concerns.”110 Senator Kempthorne also gave rights-of-
way examples from his days as mayor of Boise, Idaho, “I will tell you, Mr. 
President, that there is no way in the world that the FCC, 3,000 miles away, 
could have coordinated that.”111 
In explaining his amendment, which was adopted, Senator Gorton 
made clear that the amendment was intended to remove the FCC’s 
 
 106. 141 CONG. REC. 15604 (1995). 
 107. Id. at 15986. 
 108. Id. at 16353 (emphasis added to indicate changes from Hutchison amendment). 
 109. See id. at 15986. 
 110. Id. at 15591. 
 111. Id. at 15593. 
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jurisdiction over barriers to entry—the very kinds of management and 
compensation requirements that Senators Feinstein and Kempthorne 
described. He stated: 
I am convinced that Senators Feinstein and Kempthorne are right in the 
examples that they give . . . . And the amendment that I propose to 
substitute for their amendment will leave that where it is at the present 
time and will leave disputes in Federal courts in the jurisdictions which 
are affected.112 
He reiterated: “[O]nce again, the alternative proposal [the Gorton 
amendment] . . . retains not only the right of local communities to deal with 
their rights of way, but their right to meet any challenge on home ground in 
their local district courts.”113 
Senator Gorton summarized, “So my modification to the Feinstein 
amendment says that in the case of these purely local matters dealing with 
rights of way, there will not be a jurisdiction on the part of the FCC 
immediately to enjoin the enforcement of those local ordinances.”114 That 
is the intended effect of the “[n]othing in this section” language in 
subsection (c).115 The Gorton amendment was adopted by the conference 
committee.116 Such a result is driven by Congress’s conscious political 
decision in the interests of intergovernmental relations not to embrace 
primary agency jurisdiction. 
Under the foregoing reading of the statute and legislative history, 
implementation of Day’s alternative administrative proposal would go 
beyond the Commission’s statutory authority. Even under a liberal reading 
of the primary jurisdiction doctrine, the Commission’s views should be 
accorded little weight. Section 253(c) is not a section of the Act 
administered by the Commission, and consequently, under principles of 
statutory interpretation, its substantive views should carry little weight.117 
 
 112. Id. at 15984. 
 113. Id. at  15986. This approach would be consistent with the difference in the venue 
provisions in Sections 402(a) and 402(b) of the Communications Act of 1934. 47 U.S.C. § 
402(a), (b) (2000). 
 114. 141 CONG. REC. 15984 (emphasis added). 
 115. Id. at 15593. 
 116. S. REP. NO. 104-230, at 16 (1996). 
 117. See Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. Dir. of Office of Workers’ Comp., 449 U.S. 268, 
278 n.18 (citing Hastings v. Earth Satellite Corp., 628 F.2d 85, 94 (D.C. Cir.) (declining to 
follow numerous Board decisions interpreting the statute), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 905 
(1980); Tri-State Terminals v. Jesse, 596 F.2d 752, 757, n.5 (7th Cir. 1979) (stating the 
“[b]oard is not a policy-making body”)); see also Martin v. Occupational Safety and Health 
Review Comm’n, 499 U.S. 144, 150-51 (1991) (according deference to the interpretation of 
a statute by the Secretary of Health rather than to a determination of the commission, even  
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IV.  BOTH PROPOSALS SHOULD BE REJECTED 
In sum, Day’s article does not make the case either for amendment of 
Section 253 or for the Commission’s adopting a more aggressive 
adjudicative role on substantive issues. Obviously, if the courts were to 
continue to divide on the meaning of Section 253, remedial legislation by 
Congress to reestablish its original meaning might become appropriate. But 
it is far from clear that the substantive outcome of legislation would be, or 
should be, as Day seeks. 
 
 
though the commission’s determinations are deemed “conclusive” under the statute, since 
the secretary’s power to render authoritative interpretations of his regulations is a necessary 
adjunct of his policymaking powers.); Motion Picture Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. FCC, 309 F.3d 
796, 801 (D.C. 2002). 
